Optimal taxation and public provision for poverty reduction

The existing literature on optimal taxation typically assumes there exists a capacity to implement complex tax schemes, which is not necessarily the case for many developing countries. We examine the determinants of optimal redistributive policies in the context of a developing country that can only implement linear tax policies due to administrative reasons. Further, the reduction of poverty is typically the expressed goal of such countries, and this feature is also taken into account in our model. We derive the optimality conditions for linear income taxation, commodity taxation, and public provision of private and public goods for the poverty minimization case and compare the results to those derived under a general welfarist objective function. We also study the implications of informality on optimal redistributive policies for such countries. The exercise reveals non-trivial differences in optimal tax rules under the different assumptions.     

The Check's in the Mail: Why the United States Lags in the Adoption of Cost-Saving Electronic Payments

The United States payment system costs around $225 billion annually and checks account for 75% of all noncash payments. Other electronic payment methods (debit cards, automated clearing house direct deposits, and debits) cost only around one third to one half as much as a check. This paper outlines the main reasons why the shift from checks to cheaper electronic payments has been slow, much slower here than in other countries. We also forecast the future use of checks and electronic payments and end by discussing policy initiatives that may speed up this substitution process.     

Microeconomic and Macroeconomic Influences on Entry and Exit of Firms

We examine the entry and exit process in the Finnish manufacturing industry using a six year panel of three-digit industries. The results show that scale economies form a significant entry barrier, but the evidence on their role as an exit barrier is weaker. Industry growth has a positive influence on entry and a negative influence on exit, but also variables describing the general economic climate have an influence on the entry-exit process. The variables describing the monetary transmission mechanism have an expected influence on entry. However, the role of macroeconomic influences on exit is inconclusive. Both entry and exit have almost unit elasticity with respect to industry size, measured by the number of firms in the previous period. Entry and exit rates are therefore practically independent of industry size.     

Measuring the gender wage gap—a methodological note

ABSTRACT

We propose to estimate the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition by a single-equation model augmented with interactions between the group membership and other predictors. The relative importance of predictors on the discriminatory wage gap is examined by the interaction coefficients, which may lead to very different conclusions than the usual percentage calculations using the detailed decomposition method. Comparisons are made between the traditional interpretations and those suggested here using wage data from Finland. The decomposition analysis suggests that the discriminatory male-female wage gap is largely related to work experience, while our preferred model points to the importance of family gap and working industry.     

Time delays,competitive interdependence,and firm performance

Research summary: Competitors' experiences of prior interactions shape patterns of rivalry over time. However, mechanisms that influence learning from competitive experience remain largely unexamined. We develop a computational model of dyadic rivalry to examine how time delays in competitors' feedback influence their learning. Time delays are inevitable because the process of executing competitive moves takes time, and the market's responses unfold gradually. We analyze how these lags impact learning and, subsequently, firms' competitive behavior, industry profits, and performance heterogeneity. In line with the extant learning literature, our findings reveal that time delays hinder learning from experience. However, this counterintuitively increases rivals' profits by reducing their investments in costly head‐to‐head competition. Time delays also engender performance heterogeneity by causing rivals' paths of competitive behavior to diverge. Managerial summary: While competitive actions such as new product launches, geographical expansion, and marketing campaigns require up‐front resource commitments, the potential lift in profits takes time to materialize. This time delay, combined with uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of competitive actions, makes it difficult for managers to learn reliably from previous investment decisions. This results in systematic underinvestment in competitive actions. The severity of the underinvestment grows as the time delay between an investment and its positive results increases. Counterintuitively, however, competitors' collective underinvestment increases profit‐making opportunities. In industries with large time delays, companies that do invest in competitive actions are likely to enjoy high returns on investment. It is also likely that rivals' paths of competitive behavior bifurcate. Together, these mechanisms generate large differences in competitors' profits. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal portfolios in commodity futures markets

We develop a general approach to portfolio optimization in futures markets. Following the Heath–Jarrow–Morton (HJM) approach, we model the entire futures price curve at once as a solution of a stochastic partial differential equation. We also develop a general formalism to handle portfolios of futures contracts. In the portfolio optimization problem, the agent invests in futures contracts and a risk-free asset, and her objective is to maximize the utility from final wealth. In order to capture self-consistent futures price dynamics, we study a class of futures price curve models which admit a finite-dimensional realization. More precisely, we establish conditions under which the futures price dynamics can be realized in finite dimensions. Using the finite-dimensional realization, we derive a finite-dimensional form of the portfolio optimization problem and study its solution. We also give an economic interpretation of the coordinate process driving the finite-dimensional realization.     

Is Whistle-blowing Compatible with Employee Loyalty?

Whistle-blowing would appear to involve a conflict between employee loyalty and protection of public interest. Several business ethicists have, however, argued that this conflict is indeed merely apparent. According to the central argument to that effect, when the nature of employee loyalty is understood correctly, it becomes clear that whistle-blowing does not threaten employees’ loyalty to their employer. This is because blowing the whistle about one’s employer’s wrongdoing and being loyal to them serves the same goal, the moral good of the employer. In this article, I assess this philosophical argument for the conclusion that the moral problem of whistle-blowing is not real. I argue that the way of defending the view that whistle-blowing is not morally problematic is implausible.     

Pension Prefunding, Ageing, and Demographic Uncertainty

Pension prefunding can be used to smooth contribution rates in economies where ageing will increase pension expenditure. But how extensive should prefunding be in a defined benefit pension system when there is considerable uncertainty concerning future mortality, fertility, and migration? We study the prefunding rules in the Finnish earnings-related pension system with an OLG simulation model. The results show that increasing the degree of prefunding could yield a more even intergenerational outcome and make future generations' position better, but it is quite possible to overshoot and harm current generations too much. Making the degree of prefunding fertility-dependent appears to be a useful alternative. With declining fertility, current large cohorts would pay modestly increased contributions. The accumulated funds, however, will be huge in relation to the wage bills of smaller future cohorts.     

Julie Hessler. A Social History of Soviet Trade: Trade Policy, Retail Practices, and Consumption, 1917-1953. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004. xvi + 366 pp. ISBN 0-691-11492-7, $39.50.

Julie Hessler’s work is the first comprehensive historyof the first thirty-five years of Soviet trade written afterthe opening of the Soviet Union’s archives following thatnation’s collapse. It will, without doubt, become a standardwork of reference. Hessler gives due credit to the Soviet historianG. A. Dikhtiar’s three-volume work on Russian and Soviettrade published in the 1960s (in Russian). Despite the book’sobvious ideological overtones, it deserves to be read alongsideHessler’s work. Hessler’s